Filip Panoski: Seven Years of Failed Side Projects to $40K MRR with Bazzly
Self-taught developer who spent seven years building side projects with almost no revenue, quit a $7K/month job, and grew a Reddit marketing SaaS from $19 MRR to $40K MRR / $500K ARR in about a year.
Editorial profile. Written by IndieFounder Editorial Team from publicly available information. It is not a direct interview: the first-person answers are our summary of the founder's public statements, not verbatim quotes. Figures are approximate and not independently verified. Report an error.
- MRR
- $40K
- ARR
- $500K
- Users
- Not publicly detailed
- Founded
- 2025
- Team
- Small (with Tibo)
- Stack
How did the long failed phase end?
Filip Panoski is a self-taught developer based in Skopje, North Macedonia. He spent roughly seven years building side projects after work: nights, weekends, holidays. He has publicly described shipping five or more products in that period and generating essentially zero meaningful revenue from them. Earlier attempts included B2C tools and one-time payment products. Those experiments taught him that optional or low-LTV ideas are hard to bootstrap without existing distribution.
He has said the pattern was classic: build something technically interesting, get a few signups or “this is cool” reactions, then watch people leave without paying. In a Medium post from early 2026 he noted that most of his tools stalled at “a few random payments.” The one that eventually worked solved a boring, recurring pain where users could tell immediately whether it was working.
In 2025 he quit a $7,000-per-month developer job to go full-time on a single product. Public posts describe the first six months after quitting as still stuck near $100 MRR. The safety net of a salary had, in his view, made it easier to keep starting over instead of committing. Going all-in removed that option.
Bazzly’s own about page states that the service matched its first Reddit post for a customer on June 2, 2025. The product is a Reddit marketing platform: it scans for high-intent posts and Google-ranking threads, scores them, drafts replies, can post via a user’s own account (Chrome extension) or aged warmed-up accounts, adds upvotes, and supports DMs and brand tracking. It is operated by Meeteo Labs, LLC (US-registered). Filip founded it; he later partnered with Tibo (Tibo Louis-Lucas).
What does the growth path look like in his own numbers?
All revenue figures below are self-reported by Filip on X. He has not published Stripe screenshots or third-party audits in the posts reviewed for this story. Treat the numbers as founder-stated.
In a November 19, 2026 post he laid out the timeline from $19 MRR roughly one year earlier to $40K MRR:
- $0 → $100: 6 months
- $100 → $1K: 2 months
- $1K → $5K: 3 months
- $5K → $10K: 2.5 months
- $10K → $25K: 7 weeks
- $25K → $40K: 2 weeks
He noted the early phase was painfully slow and the later phase was fast, and that most people quit at the first step. Earlier the same week he posted that Bazzly had just hit $500K ARR, adding “1 year ago it was at $19 MRR.” His X bio at the time listed $40K MRR. In mid-November he also wrote that the product had been adding roughly $5K MRR per week until growth forced them to close signups and open a waitlist again, prioritizing existing customers.
In an earlier post he described stage-specific moves:
- At ~$100 MRR the bottleneck was the offer; he made the core offer more valuable and repositioned → $1K.
- At $1K the bottleneck was him (solo); he offered 50% of the company to Tibo and repositioned again → $10K.
- At $10K the bottleneck was demand/capacity; they doubled prices → higher-value customers and $35K range, later $40K.
He has repeatedly said the partnership with Tibo would not have happened if he had stopped showing up during the long zero-revenue years. Public site copy confirms the current team is Filip and Tibo.
Older secondary write-ups (April 2026 around $1.7K MRR, July 2026 around $7.5K/month) are consistent with the early part of the curve he later published, but the recent self-reported figures are the ones he is currently standing behind.
How does he talk about distribution and the product?
Filip’s public stance is that he focused on a validated niche with existing proof that people pay (competitors exist) and preferred B2B for better LTV and acquisition economics. He has written and posted that coding alone produced five-plus products and $0; selling produced one product and real revenue. Distribution was not assumed to be free.
Early growth relied on dogfooding: using Reddit itself, plus X and Indie Hackers, to find people already describing the problem. He has shared cold DM approaches aimed at high-intent posts rather than broad outreach. Later posts emphasize tracking the funnel (visitor → signup → trial → paid → retained) and fixing the worst drop-off, plus protecting service quality when demand spikes by throttling new signups.
The product itself targets a channel many founders already know is messy: Reddit. Features include intent scoring, draft replies that follow subreddit norms, posting options that reduce ban risk (warmed accounts with refunds on early removals), targeting of threads that already rank on Google, and an MCP/API so agents can act. Site data (as of October 2026) cites hundreds of thousands of posts scored and thousands of comments posted since the June 2025 start. Pricing is a single plan with published credit costs; comments from a user’s own account are free.
He continues to post on X about the numbers, the bottlenecks, and the “never stop showing up” theme. The audience is still relatively modest (around 7.5K followers in mid-November 2026), which fits the story of growth coming more from product-channel fit and direct outreach than from a large personal brand.
What is still incomplete or uncertain?
- Exact current paying customer count, churn, and margin are not public.
- Independent verification of the $40K MRR / $500K ARR figures is not available in the primary posts reviewed.
- The precise equity split and operating roles with Tibo are not detailed beyond the public statement that they build it together and that Filip offered a large stake at the $1K stage.
- Stack, infrastructure costs, and exact team headcount beyond the two founders are not disclosed.
- The product is still early (first customer activity mid-2025). Rapid growth phases can reverse if channel rules, competition, or execution quality change.
Filip’s own framing is that the slow early period is where most people quit, that going all-in after years of side-project failure changed the outcome, and that fixing one bottleneck at a time (offer, capacity, pricing) produced the later acceleration. Those claims are consistent with the timeline he has published; they are not yet independently audited.
Lessons he keeps repeating
Pick a recurring pain in a market where people already pay. Validate that someone will pay before (or while) you build the full product. Track the actual funnel and fix the biggest leak instead of adding more channels. Be willing to raise prices or throttle growth when quality is at risk. And keep showing up through the long period where the numbers look small—because that is the part most people abandon.
Whether the current run-rate holds is something only time and more data will show. What is already public is a clear, self-documented path from near-zero side projects, through a deliberate full-time bet, to a product that Filip states is now at $40K MRR.