Nick Velkovski: Bootstrapping HeyReach from One Customer to $19.5M ARR
Macedonian founder who pivoted from a failed Reddit DM tool, rejected by YC, and built a LinkedIn outreach platform to eight-figure ARR without outside capital.
Editorial profile. Written by IndieFounder Editorial Team from publicly available information. It is not a direct interview: the first-person answers are our summary of the founder's public statements, not verbatim quotes. Figures are approximate and not independently verified. Report an error.
- MRR
- ~$1.6M (derived from self-reported ARR)
- ARR
- $19.5M+
- Users
- 8000+
- Founded
- 2023
- Team
- 50+
- Stack
- SaaS, LinkedIn Automation
How did HeyReach start after the previous company failed?
I started building companies while still at university in North Macedonia. Professors and friends said startups do not happen there. My first real company, Howitzer, was a Reddit direct-message automation tool. We raised the largest seed round in the country at the time ($500K), hired people, and served NFT and crypto projects plus some creators. Reddit eventually shut us down in the summer of 2022.
That failure forced the next move. The team built prototypes for a few platforms. We chose LinkedIn because a market already existed. HeyReach began as a side project in late 2022 — something that might help us raise for a bigger idea. I was not excited about it at first. The category was crowded with 160+ tools, and we would be dependent on one platform.
We launched a free beta in 2023. More than 200 organizations signed up and 126 were actively using it. When we turned on payments, only one customer converted, paying $139 a month. A month later we were at roughly $2K MRR. It felt validated and also fragile.
What changed the trajectory?
We ran an AppSumo deal shortly after the beta. In the first four days it brought in $190,080 in sales. That cash gave us more than a year of runway without dilution. We became profitable around $350K ARR, roughly seven months after launch.
Growth was not linear. We spent five brutal months stuck near $8K MRR. During that period I did 597 sales calls. The pattern that emerged was clear: lead-generation agencies needed a way to run multi-sender sequences safely and manage everything in one place. Most existing tools were built for individual reps or simple seat-based pricing. We doubled down on unlimited sender accounts for a flat fee, a unified inbox, and agency-first workflows.
Niching down to agencies and integrating with tools like Clay created the “holy trio” effect with complementary platforms. Six months after that focus we crossed $1M ARR. From launch to $10M ARR took 882 days. By late 2026 the self-reported figure on my X profile and posts was $19.5M+ ARR with more than 8,000 customers, still fully bootstrapped.
How did you grow without paid ads or outside capital?
Early distribution was mostly the product itself plus content and word of mouth inside the agency and GTM communities. We treated customer support as a core growth lever rather than a cost center. After a period where support quality slipped, hiring the right people and rebuilding the department around churn and closed-lost feedback fixed both retention and product direction. The roadmap is largely driven by those reasons.
We also built in public on X and elsewhere, sharing numbers, failures, and process. That created inbound from the same people who were already looking for better LinkedIn tools. No meaningful paid acquisition was used until later stages. The combination of a clear ICP, flat pricing that agencies actually wanted, integrations, and responsive support compounded.
Macedonia’s limited infrastructure (no Stripe or PayPal at the time, small local venture scene) forced us to be profitable early. Two YC rejections, including a rare callback interview after the first no, reinforced the decision to stay independent. Without investor pressure we could prioritize the customers and the margins that actually kept the company alive.
What does the work look like now?
The product continues to expand around multi-account outreach, CRM integrations, and features that reduce the manual work agencies hate. We have also started additional products under the broader GTM umbrella. The team remains largely based in Macedonia while I split time with the US. Decision-making stays relatively flat: we talk until we reach the same opinion rather than layering hierarchy.
Platform risk is real. LinkedIn has taken action against accounts and pages in the past. The response has been to keep improving safety features, diversify value beyond pure automation, and maintain high support quality so customers stay even when the underlying platform changes rules. Margins have been reported in the high range in earlier updates (around 70% net in some posts), which is typical for a focused B2B SaaS that does not run heavy paid acquisition.
Lessons that still feel true
Ship before it feels ready and charge as soon as the core value is there. The single paying customer after the beta taught us more than the 125 free users. Cash from AppSumo bought time; profitability bought options.
Talk to customers until the pattern is obvious. Five hundred sales calls is a lot of work, but it replaced months of guessing. One clear ICP and one pricing model that matches how they buy beats a broader, more “scalable” approach that nobody actually wants.
Support is product. In a crowded category where features get copied quickly, the company that answers tickets well and feeds that feedback into the roadmap keeps customers longer.
Finally, rejection and geography can be advantages. Staying bootstrapped removed the pressure to grow for the next round and let us build the kind of business we actually wanted to run — profitable, customer-focused, and still independent. The numbers people see today sit on top of roughly ten dead startups, multiple investor nos, and a long stretch of grinding at low MRR. The public posts make the outcome look faster than it was.